Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
1

Introduction
The literature on corporate divestures in developed countries has provided considerable evidence of their positive effects but Moschieri and Mair (2008) in their survey argue that our understanding of divestiture is still limited.Since the majority of the existing research targets developed economies, the effects of divestitures in emerging markets are largely under-researched (e.g., Domadenik et al., 2003; Makhija, 2004; Omran, 2004; Bartel and Harrison, 2005; Shin, 2008; Hanousek et al., 2009) . We contribute to the literature by analyzing the break-up of firms in the Czech Republic in the early 1990's and this phenomenon's short-and medium-term effects on firm performance. In this analysis we consider a break-up as a means of initial firm restructuring. We also account for the potential endogeneity of the break-up and privatization with respect to firm performance. Our results show that firm break-up has short-and medium-term positive effectsthat vanish thereafter.
The motivation behind our analysis stems from the fact that in the early 1990's the break-up of firms was the initial type of the restructuring of the large state-owned companies in Central and Eastern European (CEE) economies. The break-up of firms became one of the most important forms of restructuring because it reduced the size of firms, increased the number of firms, and brought in new management (Domadenik et al., 2003) . Break-up became the main form of early restructuring in the Czech Republic (Zemplinerová and Charap, 1994) .
Since the break-up of firms served as a first step in the restructuring pursued by the government, it can be hypothesized that in the short-run the break-up of firms improves corporate performance as the new firms strive to establish themselves on the market and to improve corporate governance.
1 When considering the medium-and longrun effects of firm break-up the overall picture is rather uncertain. On the one hand, firm break-up and certain types of corporate ownership can enhance performance by eliminating diseconomies of scale and by serving as a disciplining device for management. On the other hand, firm break-up can have a negative effect because of substandard corporate governance, weak government coordination and regulation, unclear property rights, and the underdeveloped legal and institutional framework that exists in emerging market economies ).
2
Further, there are different reasons for restructuring between market and transformation economies. The need for the restructuring of firms in market economies focuses on the trade-off between transaction costs via markets and the internal inefficiencies within organizations. However, in the context of transformation economies, the focus is on the bargaining between the key decision-makers (such as managers, politicians, workers, and new private owners) after restructuring/privatization. Grosfeld and Roland (1996) argue that in the early phase of transition, there was high expectation that price liberalization, increased product market competition, and tight fiscal and monetary policies would create an appropriate environment to which managers of state-owned enterprises (SOE) would be forced to adjust. It was also expected that the selection of healthy enterprises and the elimination of unprofitable ones would start immediately. However, these expectations were not met due to the large-scale asset-stripping behavior of SOE managers and skilful protectionism against the pressures to change (Grosfeld and Roland 1996) . Overall, the need to restructure generally inefficient state enterprises and the required privatization processes in the CEE region fostered a debate over the sequence: whether restructuring should be done prior to or after privatization. A number of studies consider these two processes counterbalancing, and thus treats them as "friends or enemies" (Aghion et al., 1994; Kotrba, 1996; Pohl et al., 1997; Roland, 2000) .
A special feature of restructuring in transformation economies is defensive vs.
strategic types of restructuring, introduced by Grosfeld and Roland (1996) and Aghion et al. (1997) and tested for by Domadenik et al. (2008) . Defensive restructuring includes measures that seek to reduce costs and scale down enterprise activity with the primary goal of the immediate survival of the enterprise. In contrast, strategic restructuring is based on a thoughtful business strategy developed in response to a need for a significant redeployment of assets (introduction of new product lines, new processes, new technologies, or new investments). 2 These types of restructuring came to play in brokenup firms only after their break-up and subsequent privatization, though. In any event,
D 'Souza et al. (2007) show that restructuring and changes in corporate governance are important determinants of post-privatization performance.
2 Empirical evidence on enterprise restructuring in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic suggests that significant restructuring measures were mainly defensive in nature and the extent of strategic restructuring was much more limited (Grosfeld and Roland, 1996) . Domadenik et al. (2008) show that firms in Slovenia actively adjusted employment, and the adjustment was of both a defensive (short-term) and strategic (long-term) nature. Significant investment only took place in firms that were privatized, with foreign ownership or through retained earnings.
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The overall expectation is that any active restructuring of an enterprise, including company break-up, would tend to improve operating efficiency, increase cash flow, and ultimately, enhance firm profitability; 3 however, it is not clear how long the effect of firm break-up would last, or if break-up would be the appropriate starting point for more active corporate governance. These general observations are valid with respect to the break-up of firms in the Czech Republic as well as in other CEE emerging markets because before the 1990's the socialist planners preferred large firms whose size in these countries was excessive when compared to firm size in market economies ).
Although firm break-up is an important phenomenon in emerging market economies, surprisingly little research has been produced in the context of the CEE countries.Two recent contributions address the issue by employing data on Czech firms and show positive effects of break-ups in general. However, both have some limitations. Lizal et al. (2001) show that small-and medium-sized divestitures have positive effects on the productive efficiency and profitability of both the parent companies and divested units in the year when the division occurs. However, the authors do not know the identities of the firms and have to use indirect methods to identify divestitures and then link the divested units to the parent firms. Moreover, the authors can follow the firms only during the year of the breakup (1991) and the following year (1992). provide evidence of generally positive effects in divested Czech firms with detailed results varying across the new owners. However, their study covers only the two-year period (1995) (1996) following the privatization of divested firms.
Since we have richer data with an exact identification of all firms and a longer time span, we are able to overcome the earlier shortcomings and credibly estimate the effects of the break-up of firms in the Czech Republic. We analyze the effect of firm break-up and subsequent changes in ownership structure due to privatization, a feature that is frequently missing in the literature. However, ownership changes were shown by Cusatis et al. (1993) and Bartel and Harrison (2005) to be important. We also investigate the short-and medium-term effects of firm break-up, as these have been documented to be important (Cho and Cohen, 1997 ), but have not been thoroughly researched yet (Moschieri and Mair, 2008) .
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Specifically, in this paper we contribute to the literature in two ways. First, we analyzeof how the break-up of firms in an emerging market affects firms' medium-term economic performance. To do so, we study the performance of new units (emerging from the break-up), as well as the performance of the original master firms. Second, we study this question while accounting for endogeneity issues by employing propensity score matching.In our approach we consider firm break-up as the "treatment" variable and by estimating the medium-term effects of the break-up we study the average treatment effect on the treated subject (ATT). In this respect we conduct two matching procedures: 1) we follow the mainstream research on firm divestures and match new firms resulting from a break-up and those not from a break-up, and 2) we reconstruct the master firm performance indicators and match master firms with those not experiencing break-up. The combination of both approaches enables us to capture the total effect of the break-up. The employed dual approach, i.e., a combination of the break-up effects observed on new units and master firms, is an ideal application of p-score matching.
Moreover, an identification strategy using p-score matching during the pre-privatization and pre-firm break-up periods should be better equipped to address endogeneity issues along with the attrition problem than a classical IV estimation (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002 ).
An additional key value-added of the present paper is that we cover several years after the break-up of firms, a long enough period to uncover the medium-term effects of firm break-up. In the paper we show that even more than five years after firm break-up, the effects of firm break-up were still positive. However, the effects in subsequent years turned out to be negative and later insignificant as the number of observations was reduced substantially by the end of our sample in 2005.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we outline the institutional setting underlying our analysis and formulate the hypotheses to be tested. In Section 3 we present our data, variables, and the method for identifying firm break-up. Section 4 describes our estimating framework. We present our empirical results in Section 5 and conclude in Section 6.
The Institutional Setting and Hypotheses
In this section we outline the main features of the institutional setting underlying the surge of firm break-up in our data set. The break-up of firms took place during the period 1991-1992, prior to the launch of the mass privatization scheme, also known as The decisions on corporate break-up were taken by the relevant government ministries in conjunction with the government privatization authority. Hence, the breakup of firms as well as privatization did not occur at random as the decision for each firm was based on the winning privatization project that outlined the proposed framework for the break-up of the firm. 5 Consequently, the endogeneity of the break-up as well as postprivatization ownership have to be taken into account despite the fact that the decisions to privatize and even the specific design of the programs were dictated by politics and not performance criteria (Boycko et al., 1994) .
Following this surge of the break-up of firms, the new units, which were transformed into joint-stock companies, were privatized during 1992-1993 in the voucher scheme. The voucher scheme was part of the large-scale privatization process and two waves of voucher privatization took place in 1992-93 and 1993-94.
Privatization was to eradicate in the quickest possible way public ownership as this was associated with a communist ideology. 6 Shares from the first and second wave were distributed in 1993 and early 1995, respectively, creating the early post-privatization ownership structure. There was also significant post-privatization share trading (often off the official stock market) among large shareholders during 1995-1996 (for details see Hanousek and Němeček, 2001 ).
Let us note that the break-up of firms happened well before any new owners started to control privatized companies and therefore there was no monetary effect 4 A detailed description of the privatization mechanism is to a large extent irrelevant with respect to our analysis. For more details on the privatization process see, e.g., Kočenda (1999) , Hanousek and Kočenda (2008) , and Estrin et al. (2009) , among others. 5 The privatization of each state-owned firm was decided on the basis of an officially accepted privatization project. According to the law, all state-owned enterprises were selected either for the first or the second privatization wave or they were temporarily exempted. Each selected firm had to submit an official privatization proposal that was usually crafted by the firm's management under the tutelage (and responsibility) of its sectoral ministry. Any domestic or foreign corporate body or individual was allowed to present a competing project that was to be considered on an equal footing with the official one. See Hanousek et al. (2009) for details that are beyond the scope relevant for this paper. 6 Shleifer and Treisman (2005) show that privatization was very successful from a political point of view almost from the outset. However, Hanousek and Kočenda (2008) and Kočenda and Hanousek (2009) show that state control over privatized firms was considerable and persisted well beyond the completion of privatization.
6 associated with the divestiture. In other words, the break-ups did not affect the accounting figures of the involved companies and we can therefore use the original composition of the master firm to reconstruct their financial indicators even after the break-up of the firm. This means we can analyze the break-up from both the divestedand master-firm point of view to capture the total effect of the break-up.
The structural and institutional features observed in emerging market economies in general, and the Czech Republic in particular, lead us to test two competing hypotheses with respect to firm break-up and privatization:
1. Break-up and privatization have a positive effect on the performance of the resulting units by eliminating inefficiencies such as the diseconomies of scale of large SOEs, weak managerial incentives and information asymmetries that existed prior to economic liberalization and the reduction of state control.
2.
Divestitures and privatization have a negative effect on the performance of the resulting units because of weak corporate governance, waning government coordination and regulation, unclear property rights, and the underdeveloped legal and institutional framework in emerging market economies.
Further, the short-and medium-term effects of firm break-up were shown to be important (Cho and Cohen, 1997) but they have not been thoroughly researched yet (Moschieri and Mair, 2008) . Therefore, in terms of the time effect of the break-up we test this hypothesis:
3. Break-up does not have a permanent effect on the performance of new units.
As mentioned above, we assess the total effects of the break-up of firms and test all hypotheses on financial indicatorsfor new firms resulting from break-up as well as forreconstructed indicators of the original master firms.
Data, Identification of Break-up, and Definitions of Variables
We deviate from the standard sequencing and introduce our data prior to describing our Along with these 130 newly created firms, we also have data on 780 firms that did not experience any firm break-up and they constitute our control group. The firms in both groups were subsequently privatized in the first wave of the voucher scheme. This means that all the firms were privatized at the same time using the same privatization method and thus, the treatment effect of privatization affected all firms-with or without break-up-in a uniform manner. 8
The institutional setting described in Section 2 has strong implications for data quality. Boycko et al. (1994) showed that the decision to pursue mass privatization and even the specific designs of the programs were largely dictated by politics. This is consistent with the imperative of politicians losing control in privatized firms voiced by Roland (1994) and Boycko et al. (1996) . Hence, the early wave of firm break-up followed by the subsequent privatization of new units were primarily tools to prevent the revival of communist economic ideas rather than a profit-making enterprise for the state.
Later privatizations of the residual state property in the 2000's were directed more toward maximizing gains. Finally, based on the subsequent identified ownership structure available from our data, we assign each firm with an ownership corresponding to the following categories of owner: the state, an industrial firm, an individual owner, or a financial company.
For each firm in our data set, we have detailed information derived from all the proposed privatization projects that were submitted to the government before privatization. This includes the relevant information about the break-up of the firm, the links between the parent (master) company and new units, the privatization scheme, and information on assets, liabilities, profit, sales, and number of employees in 1990. Table 1 displays pre-firm break-up economic indicators in 1990 for the new units, parent firms, and firms in the control group. A key observation is that new units were more capitalintensive and less labor-intensive than non-broken firms. A striking difference can also be observed in the number of privatization projects submitted for new units, which 7 These new firms received new tax identification numbers and had the same rights to use the brand and/or trade name of the former parent enterprise. Originally there were 131 new firms but we use only 130 of them since for one divested firm no relevant data covering the period under research are available. 8 In this scheme altogether 988 firms were privatized. This means that there are only 77 firms (8% of the total) for which the data are dubious due to legal problems associated with privatization and we do not include them in our sample. Due to the high percentage of firms not experiencing break-up and the complete set of new firms in the data set, there is virtually no truncation involved in our case.
greatly exceeds that for non-broken firms. This difference points to greater interest in new units and bigger expectations for them on the part of potential investors. For many enterprises there were several privatization projects submitted and their number was directly and primarily related to the number of divisions within each firm or the number of units into which a firm could be naturally divided. Each privatization project reflected the structure of the firm, managers' motives, degree of investor interest, and expected future performance of the firm. However, prior to firm break-up and privatization, the non-broken firms exhibit better performance measured by scaled profit and sales than new units. Finally, in Figure 1 we illustrate the average performance developments in firms with and without break-up after the break-up of firms and privatization. We present four indicators of corporate performance recorded with a yearly frequency: the operating profit per total assets to show unit performance irrespective of size, the operating profit per equity to allow for changes in capital structure, the profit over staff costs to provide a perspective on differences in cost effectiveness among firms, and finally a value-added as a complementary standard productivity measure. Using all firms for which data are available in a given year, we compute and plot the mean values for firms with and without break-up during the post-break-up and post-privatization period (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) . In terms of profit indicators, we observe a stable upward trend that is most pronounced for profit per total assets and staff costs and less pronounced in the case of profit per equity.
In both upward trends new units also record higher performance than non-broken firms, especially in terms of the labor productivity measure. All the profit measures exhibit some degree of seasonality with a sharp drop in 1999 that echoes the poor economic performance and the country's negative aggregate growth in 1998. Other ups and downs are likely to reflect less-than-complete reporting by firms rather than economic reasons.
Primarily, in later years we observe a sizeable drop in the number of observations for both new units and non-broken firms. The reasons why some firms are not recorded in our panel data set in later years are: a) they were acquired, b) they underwent a bankruptcy procedure, or c) those firms were no longer required to regularly publish their annual income statements by law and thus failed to do so. Unfortunately, we were not able to fully distinguish the reasons for each firm. Finally, the value-added indicator 9
shows consistently better performance of new units over non-broken firms, albeit with a considerable drop during the period 2001-2005.
To conclude, generally positive performance findings at first glance show a better position for new firms resulting from break-up during the whole period under research. This observation should be viewed with a caution as developments of the performance indicators are presented for all firms for which data were available in a given year. Hence, these are raw data that have no way to present a true picture in which the endogeneity of firm break-up and ownership change with respect to performance could be properly processed and accounted for. This task will be performed in the next step. First we introduce our methodology (Section 4) and then empirical findings (Section 5).
The Estimating Framework
General Outline
From the methodology perspective the break-up of a firm represents a treatment that is present in a group of divested firms but absent in a control group of firms that did not experience a break-up.
10 approach is suitable provided adequate instruments are available and the time span is adequate.
In our analysis we take a different approach, though. In order to capture the total effect of the break-up of a firm we need to analyze the effects of the break-up on both the new units resulting from the break-up as well as on the original master firms.
Obviously, the employed method should account for the possible endogenous character of the break-up along with sample selection due to potential data attrition. As time goes on some firms might fail to report data or even completely disappear. Then, it is natural that as less data becomes available, the estimation and identification of the desired effects becomes less accurate and meaningful.
For the reasons articulated above we use in our analysis propensity score matching and DID estimation instead of the classical IV approach. This allows us to correctly study the medium-term effects of firm break-up on corporate performance while accounting for endogeneity issues. To do so, we study the performance of new units as well as the performance of the original master firms. We consider firm break-up as the "treatment" variable and we study the average treatment effect on the treated subject (ATT). In this respect we conduct two matching procedures. First, we follow the mainstream of the research on firm divestures and match new firms resulting from a break-up with those not experiencing break-up. Second, we reconstruct master firm performance indicators and match master firms with those not experiencing break-up.
The combination of both approaches enables us to capture the total effect of the breakup. This dual approach, i.e., a combination of the break-up effects observed on new units and master firms, is an ideal application of p-score matching.
Further, an identification strategy using p-score matching during the preprivatization and pre-firm break-up period can also better address endogeneity issues together with the data attrition problem when compared with the IV technique (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002) . This is because we are interested in the effect of firm break-up; other influences are of secondary interest but we still control for them. In the case of p-score matching the proper evaluation of the impact of a break-up on the performance of a firm involves speculation about how this firm would have performed if it was not divested (see Roy, 1951 and Rubin, 1974 The parameter that has been widely used in the evaluation literature is the socalled average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), which is defined as:
From the perspective of the general type of divestiture the ATT measures the difference in the potential performance of a divested firm in the two states of being and not being divested. Because we do not observe the mean for divested firms, we have to define an appropriate alternative for it as E[Y 1 | DIV = 0] in order to estimate the ATT. A widely used strategy is to assume that for a given subset of observable variables X that are not affected by firm break-up, the potential firm outcome is independent of treatment indicator D i . In a seminal paper Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) suggest to use so-called balancing scores to overcome the dimensionality problem in X. The independence of a potential outcome given a set of variables X is then transferred to conditional independence on a balancing score b(X).
The propensity score P(DIV = 1|X) = P(X), i.e., the probability for a firm to be divested given its observed covariates X, is the suitable balancing score. The propensity score (p-score) is then formally defined as , ,
Using the propensity score, the p-score estimator for ATT can be written as
The time index t indicates the sequencing and proper variables used: break-up (divestiture) happened at time t, conditioning for p-score matching is done on pre-firm break-up characteristics (X t-1 ), and the evaluation of ATT occurs several periods after the break-up of the firm. Basically, the ATT PSM estimator is nothing but the mean difference in firm performance over the common support, appropriately weighted by the propensity score distribution of matched firms. Under such assumptions the matching method results in an unbiased estimate of the treatment impact such as firm break-up; for more discussion of the treatment effect see Dehejia and Wahba (2002) or Smith and Todd (2005) , among others.
Despite the fact that the literature on matching estimators considers several kinds of estimators, the ATT PSM defined in (3) that uses adifference-in-differences (DID) matching technique is considered a superior estimator. 12 The DID matching estimator allows for temporally invariant differences in outcomes between treated and control (non-treated) units that can arise (Smith and Todd, 2005) . The property that the DID matching estimator eliminates time-invariant differences in performance between divested and non-divested firms is counterbalanced by the fact that the DID matching estimator is more data-demanding and requires the use of longitudinal data before and after treatment and a suitable set of conditioning variables for pair matching.
Since we employ panel data we greatly benefit from the DID matching estimator's quality. Further, we use a set of conditioning variables-i.e., pre-firm breakup characteristics such as the size of the firm, industrial sector, and pre-break-up (and pre-privatization) performance indicators, along with proxies for the future ownership structure-that satisfy the required conditions. Therefore, in the present paper we employ propensity score matching that fully accounts for the outlined endogeneity and is well suited for our purpose due to the longitudinal character of our data.
Our Estimation Approach
As mentioned in the previous sections, we estimate the causal average effect of treatment on the treated subject (ATT), i.e., the effect of break-up on new units.
Specifically, we test these effects 1) on the new units that emerged from a break-up (130 firms) with respect to those that did not experience break-up (780 firms) and 2) on original master firms (44 firms) that were broken-up with respect to those that were not (780 firms). The first set of ATT effects is a mainstream result while the second set serves as a complementary result.
In the above outline Y j is a measure of the corporate performance of new units resulting from break-up (j=1, DIV t = 1) or firms that were not broken (j=0, DIV t = 0).
The period when we compare firm performance is 1996-2006; the initial period t 0 refers to 1996, after the post-privatization changes in ownership structures were settled. Our estimator of interest ATT introduced in (3) therefore reflects the difference in performance between the current (t 0 +k) and initial period (t 0 ). Similar to other matching studies, we match firms within the same industrial sector.
First, it is possible to estimate the causal effect of firm break-up on firm performance by assuming that firm break-up is as good as random conditional on the observed characteristics among the firms that have a similar predicted probability of being subject to break-up (divested) 1| , where t denotes the time of the break-up of the firm. Then, the causal effect is defined as the difference between the average performance over k years of firms (denoted as , , 1 ) that became new units after the break-up (were divested) and the hypothetical performance of the same firms had they not been divested (denoted as , , 1 ). The probability of being divested (the propensity score) is assumed to depend on a set of pre-firm break-up (as well as pre-privatization) observable characteristics. The fact that we are able to use for matching pre-firm break- 
where we consider various functional forms of size (log of capital, capital, and capital squared), industrial sectors, and pre-firm break-up indicators represented by sales per total assets (s_tns) and profit per total assets (p_tns). To capture the future ownership structure we consider the proxies derived from privatization projects: the percentage of shares held by investment privatization funds (ipf) and municipalities (munic). With these two variables we control for the initial ownership structure intended for privatized firms. In addition we also employ a relative excess employment variable (DE i )to control for differences in firm size. In the logit specification we also use some of these variables squared.In Table 2 we list all the observables introduced above. The financial and economic characteristics are easy to understandand we provide the necessary intuitionfor the rest of the variables below.
The relative excess employment (DE i ) variable and its construction corresponds to the fact that central planners tended to establish and maintain very large firms, both because it was easier to control a few large (rather than many small) firms and because of the prevailing political philosophy to build large firms under a command regime.
Thus, relative excess employment (DE i ) is a matching criterion that measures the number of employees in a firm in 1990 minus the number of employees in a (weighted)
average firm belonging to the same industrial sector in the OECD economies in the same period (see Kumar et al., 1999) .
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Finally, the proportions of assets held by investment privatization funds and municipalities are proxies for corporate governance. Investment privatization funds held substantial stakes in privatized firms, pursued profitable opportunities, and were also found to engage in defensive restructuring by reducing employment (Hanousek et al., 2007) . Hence, they are taken as a proxy for the extent of corporate governance.
Municipalities received various ownership stakes as free property transfers and became stakeholders in numerous companies, mainly in utilities and transportation, but being a 13 We take the mean OECD firm size as a benchmark because the transition countries declared their commitment to move towards a standard market economy and many, including the Czech Republic, succeeded in joining the OECD in 1995, soon after the start of the transition. One of the determining factors for a divestiture is therefore likely to be the size of the firms that emerged from the centrally planned system, relative to the size of firms in established market (OECD) economies. Since the socialist planners preferred large firms, the relative employment variable (DEi) captures effectively the excessive size of enterprises under central planning relative to the firm size in market economies and serves as a matching variable. The DEi variable can also be understood as an instrument for divestiture. We run our matching procedure without this variable but the results (available upon request) were not materially different as we primarily control for the size of the company and industrial sector, which indirectly corresponds to the definition of DEi.
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part of the state ownership structure they did not pursue an overly active role in the companies . They are then taken as a proxy for weak corporate governance.
For all observables listed in Table 2 we provide marginal effects along with the p-value of the marginal effectfor each variable. To capture the possible heavier tail distribution we primarily employed a logit model, however, we also checked that a probit model yields very similar results. Since the purpose of estimating equation (4) is classification rather than the estimation of underlying structural coefficients, the optimal choice of the underlying functional form is not an issue (Smith, 1997) .
The estimated p-scores are later used to control for influential factors in the score matching procedure. We can derive several key observations from the table. The size of the firm measured by the log of capital is a key factor behind firm break-up. The marginal effect shows that the bigger the firm the greater the probability of the break-up occurrence.
14 A similar observation can be made for marginal effects associated with other variables. However, in most cases the effect is economically marginal. Finally, based on relatively high values of R 2 and stable results across different specifications we conclude that the employed variables adequately characterize firms for the propensity score matching procedure.
Empirical Results
Effect of break-up on new units
We present our results in Tables 3 and 4 . For estimation we used STATA 10 and specifically we employ the standard procedure psmatch2 implemented by Leuven and Sianesi (2003) , with kernel matching using a Gaussian kernel. Standard errors were obtained by using bootstrapping methods. An additional STATA procedure pstest was used for covariate imbalance testing.
First we show performance results measured in terms of operating profit scaled by total assets and operating profit scaled by firm equity (Table 3) . Scaling by total assets helps to put the performance indicator into the perspective of the firm's profitability irrespective of its size. The second measure complements the information on performance by accounting for changes in capital structure, as equity can often change over time. Further, we use profit over staff costs as a measure of labor 14 We also include the results of the p-score estimation where we exclude different measures of firm size.
16 productivity and finally a value-added as a complementary standard productivity measure (Table 4) .
In Tables3 and 4, separately for each year we present the average treatment effect on treated firms (ATT) along with the statistical significance of the effect. Treated firms are the new firms resulting from the break-up of the master firm andthe average treatment effects on treated firms show time-dependent positive or negative differences in the performance of new firms with respect to the performance of non-treated firms (without break-up). For example, in 1996 new firms recorded a profit over total assets that was 0.039 times larger than the profits of non-broken firms. In the same year the profit over equity of new firms was 0.628 times larger when compared with non-broken companies (Table 3 ). In 1996 profit over staff costs were 1.587 times larger and the value-added was 6.035 times larger in new firms when compared to non-broken firms (Table 4 ). In 1997 the effects related to profit over total assets and profit over equity were even larger than in 1996, while the profit over staff costs and value-added were smaller but still positive and statistically significant. The situation changes afterwards.
The observed effects presented in Tables 3 and 4 are quite uneven: after growing gradually, there is a sharp drop into negative territory. In more detail, at the beginning of the researched period new firms resulting from the break-up of the master firms exhibit better performance than non-broken firms. This positive difference gradually increases for a limited period of time and quickly reaches its peak around 1997-1998. During the subsequent stage the positive differences become negative when statistically significant values are available. For the rest of the observed period values become mostly negative, albeit without being statistically significant. Therefore, judgment has to be made carefully as the numbers of observed data for both new and non-broken firms were dropping considerably in the later years of our sample. As our paper is the first attempt to analyze the medium-and long-term effects of the break-up of firms we acknowledge the fact that due to the drop in the treated sample size after 1999 we cannot possibly capture the long-term effect in full. However, we report the results for all years for which we have data along with changes in the treated sample for the sake of completeness. We observe that the effect of firm break-up rapidly dissipates. Since break-up was the initial form of restructuring, the intuition behind this result is that the performance-enhancing potential of the break-up was exhausted quickly. Hence, later improvements in the performance of firms had to be due to other factors. Based on the relevant literature we conjecture that the most likely factors were changes in ownership structure and management (see Roland, 2000; Estrin at al., 2009) .
The values of the observed effects in Tables 3 and 4 are based on the large total number of matched observations between treated and non-treated firms, e.g. the total number of firms that were exposed to matching (shown in the column labeled N).
Further, we show the number of new units used for matching that were successfully matched with adequate firms not experiencing break-up based on a set of matching indicators (column N treated matched). Finally, we show the number of non-broken (control) firms used for matching (column N controls matched). The ratios between the total number of firms used for matching (N) and the number of matched firms emerging from break-up (N treated matched) vary over time. In the majority of the years these ratios exceed 10%. In many years they are well below 50%, though. Thus, the range of these ratios suggests that the common support problem could be a relevant concern in these data. For this reason, we perform a thorough check of the results presented in Tables 3 and 4 to assess how well the propensity score did to balance observables across the matched new units (treated) and non-broken (control) firms. We perform a series of balancing tests, e.g., the two-sample t-tests suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) .
The results of the balancing tests are presented in Table 5 . The key finding of our balancing tests is shown in the last column, which records the p-values of the test for the treated and control groups. Bold p-values for matched variables clearly indicate that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of the equality of treated and control groups for all compared variables. Hence, there is no systematic difference in the distribution of covariates after matching. Moreover, the results of our estimations presented above are based on variables that were proven to be exogenous. 15 Our results (Tables 3 and 4) are then based on a correctly specified procedure as well as an appropriate selection of variables.
Effect of break-up on master firms
The decision to break up firms was taken and carried out when all the firms under research, including the firms in our control group that were not broken, were state- We show our results in Table 6 , where we present the average treatment effect on improvements over non-broken firms that disappear after 1998. Thus, the total effect of a break-up is shown to be consistent with effects found in separate new firms.
Conclusions
We analyzed the effects of corporate divestures and ownership changes on firm performance in an emerging European market. We employed a unique data set for a large number of Czech firms over the period [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] . In our analysis we accounted for ensuing changes in ownership structure due to privatization and the endogeneity of performance with respect to firm break-up and privatization. Regression-based techniques often suffer from a lack of so-called "common support" when the characteristics of new units coming from break-up differ from firms that were not broken up. Therefore, we employed a propensity score matching procedure that fully accounted for endogeneity and was well suited for our purpose due to the panel character of our data.
Our results show that five years after the wave of firm break-up took place, the effects of firm break-up are positive. However, later on, after the post-firm break-up and post-privatization events settled down, the primarily positive effect of firm break-up dissipated very fast and in two to three years (from the beginning of our sample) it became negative or statistically indistinguishable (Tables 3 and 4 In general, our results are in line with the positive effects of firm break-up found in the literature covering developed markets. However, we show that within five to 20 seven years after divesture and even sooner after the subsequent privatization these effects disappear. Since break-up was the initial form of restructuring we believe that the performance-enhancing potential of firm break-up was exhausted quickly.
Consequently, factors like changes in ownership structure and management are to be found behind later improvements in the performance of firms. Note: ATT denotes the average treatment effect on treated. It is the effect of the break-up (treatment) on the particular performance variable in new units resulting from the break-up. t-stat is the corresponding tstatistics, N denotes the total number of observations, and N treated matched and N controls matched denote the number of matched divested firms and number of matched non-divested firms, respectively. The statistical significance of the coefficients is denoted as follows: a (1%), b (5%), and c (10%). Note: Above we illustrate the average performance developments in new units emerging after break-up as well as non-broken firms after firm break-up and privatization were put into effect. Mean performance indicators are presented for all firms for which data were available in a given year. 
